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INTRODUCTION 
Brailsford uses an overly simplistic analysis to support his contention that 
Fetter, as a guarantor of certain tenant obligations under the subject Lease 
Agreement ("the lease"), is liable for the restaurant exhaust system at issue in this 
case. The mere fact the tenant had certain obligations under the lease does not 
mean Fetter, as a guarantor, is automatically liable for all of those obligations. 
The tenant obligations Fetter guaranteed are not as broad as Brailsford has 
argued. The guaranteed obligations are clearly defined and do not include the 
alleged obligation that is the subject matter of this action. The lease clearly 
delineates the improvements that were to be paid for by the landlord and the 
improvements that were to be paid for by the tenant. Fetter only guaranteed the 
items on the "Paid by Tenant" list set forth in Exhibit "B" to the lease. The "Paid 
by Tenant" list does not include payment for the exhaust system's equipment and 
installation expense. 
The fact Fetter did not guaranty the payment of rent is an additional defense 
against liability. The lease was written to include an increase in the monthly rental 
payments so that the landlord could cover the expense it incurred in installing the 
exhaust system. Payment for the exhaust system was characterized as rent under 
the lease and Fetter clearly did not guarantee the tenant's rental obligations. Even 
Brailsford has not argued that Fetter guaranteed the tenants' obligation to pay rent. 
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Brailsford's brief also ignores the strict ailes of construction applicable to 
guaranty agreements. In the present matter, in order for Fetter to be held liable for 
the exhaust system, those strict rules of construction would have to be utterly 
disregarded. 
Brailsford also incorrectly argues that Fetter's argument regarding offsets is 
being raised for the first time on appeal. Offsets is listed as an affirmative defense 
in Fetter's answer to the amended complaint. R. at p. 113. The issue of offsets 
was also raised in connection with Brailsford's motion for summary judgment in 
the trial court. See id. at pp. 231-239, 241-242, 273-280. 
Finally, Fetter has not waived his right to argue the application of the 
surrender and acceptance doctrine in this matter. Although surrender and 
acceptance is not specifically raised as an affirmative defense in Fetter's answer to 
the amended complaint, Brailsford never objected to the defense until now. See id. 
at pp. 273-280. Furthermore, the monthly payments for the exhaust system were 
specifically defined as rent. Therefore, the doctrine of surrender and acceptance 
applies even under Brailsford's argument that the doctrine is applicable only to 
rental obligations. In any event, the fact of the matter is that the premises, 
including the subject exhaust system, were returned to the landlord. The exhaust 
system has been used by subsequent restaurant businesses. Under basic legal 
principles such as the duty to mitigate and the prohibition against double recovery, 
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Fetter should not be required to pay the balance for the exhaust system, even if the 
court determines Fetter guaranteed payment for the exhaust system. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
IF ANYTHING, FETTER ONLY 
GUARANTEED THE "PAID BY TENANT" 
ITEMS OF EXHIBIT "B55 TO THE LEASE 
The express provisions of the subject Guaranty of Certain Lease Obligations 
("the guaranty55) provides that Fetter and his co-guarantor were only guaranteeing 
"all improvements to the leased premises to be paid by Tenant." R. at 198 
(emphasis added).1 The fact that the guaranty refers to improvements "to be paid 
by Tenant55 is critical to the analysis of this case because the parties specifically 
defined in the lease which obligations belonged to the landlord and which 
obligations belonged to the tenant. 
Clearly, the language of the guaranty relates back to Exhibit "B" to the lease 
which contains two separate lists itemizing the improvements to be paid by the 
landlord and the improvements to be paid by the tenant. The "PAID BY 
Specifically, the guaranty states: "the undersigned Guarantors hereby 
guarantee to Landlord the fiill and prompt payment of all costs and expenses 
incurred in connection with the design, construction and installation to all 
improvements to the Leased premises to be paid by Tenant, and the performance of 
all of Tenant's other duties and obligations set forth in Sections 12 and 14 of the 
Lease.55 R. at 198. The guaranty is limited. It is not unconditional as argued by 
Brailsford. 
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TENANT" portion of Exhibit "B" lists eleven separate items that were to be paid 
for by the tenant. Id. at 196. With respect to the subject exhaust system, Exhibit 
"B" states that the tenant was only obligated to pay for the "design of make up air 
and exhaust system." Id. (emphasis added). The tenant list does not include the 
cost of the exhaust system equipment and/or installation. That expense is 
specifically included on the landlord's list. Id. at 195. Yet, this is the amount 
Brailsford attempts to recover from Fetter as a guarantor. Simply stated, because 
the "PAID BY TENANT" list itself does not include the obligation for payment of 
the exhaust system, it is axiomatic that Fetter did not personally guarantee it. This 
is clear if the lease and the guaranty are read in context with each other. 
Ignoring the relationship between the guaranty and the subject lease 
agreement, Brailsford argues broadly that because the exhaust system was an 
improvement benefiting the tenant, Fetter guaranteed it. Not only does this 
argument disregard the clear language of the lease and the guaranty, it is also 
contrary to the authorities cited by Fetter in its opening brief that a guaranty 
agreement must be strictly construed. See Carrier Brokers, Inc. v. Spanish Trail 
761 P. 2d 258, 261 (Utah App. 1998) (citing Valley Bank & Trust v. Rite Way 
Concrete Forming, Inc., 742 P.2d 105, 110 (Utah App. 1997). In fact, Bradford's 
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brief does not challenge the application of the principle that guaranty contracts 
must be construed strictly. 
The guaranty also states that Fetter and his co-guarantor were guaranteeing 
the tenant's obligations under Section 12 of the lease. R. at p. 198.3 Brailsford, 
rather than aclaiowledging the limitations of this obligation, argues that the 
obligations under Section 12 of the lease broadly cover any and all tenant 
obligations - not just those obligations referenced in and limited by Exhibit "B" to 
the lease. Brailsford's position is inaccurate. The only logical way to read Section 
12 is that it refers back to Exhibit UB" to the lease which, as stated above, contains 
two separate lists: one for improvements to be paid for by the landlord and one for 
improvements to be paid for by the tenant. To quote the language in Section 12 
directly: 'Tenant shall be responsible, and shall pay the full cost for all other 
improvements to the premises, as shown and described on attached Exhibit "Z?" 
Even in a case relied upon by Brailsford, the court stated that the guaranty 
"depends upon the nature of the guarantor's promise." Strevall-Patterson Co, v. 
Francis, 646 P.2d 741, 743 (Utah 1982) (citation omitted). 
The guaranty also states the guarantors guaranteed tenant obligations 
under Section 14 of the lease. Fetter contends Section 14 is not at issue in this case 
because it relates to the tenant's obligations to pay for subsequent alterations to the 
premises. R. at 179-180. The subject exhaust system was not an alteration. 
Section 14.3 of the lease does refer back to the guaranty signed by Fetter and his 
co-guarantor. However, that reference does not create any additional liability. As 
argued in Point 1 herein, the guaranty is limited to those items set forth in the 
"PAID BY TENANT" list of Exhibit "B" to the lease. 
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("Tenant's Improvements")." R. at 178 (emphasis added). Because Section 12 
merely refers back to Exhibit UB," which does not contain the exhaust system in 
the "PAID BY TENANT" list, any argument Fetter guaranteed payment for the 
exhaust system fails. 
POINT 2. 
FETTER DID NOT GUARANTY 
THE PAYMENT OF RENT 
The lease reveals the tenant agreed to pay an additional amount of rent, for a 
five-year period, to cover the expense of the exhaust system, which was paid for 
initially by the landlord. Although Brailsford calls this obligation a "loan," there is 
no promissory note evidencing any separate loan obligation. It was an obligation 
under the lease defined as rent. Under Section 5 of the lease, which sets for the 
base rent terms, there are two columns setting forth annual rent and monthly rent. 
The lease states that "[t]hese amounts [referring to the base rent amounts] will 
increase to include amortization of the cost of the [exhaust system] over a 5-year 
period, with interest at 8%." R. at 175. In other words, the additional amount paid 
T A r f V* o o v l i m i p f m rc f -c * rv \ in in r\i~ 1* a. T O r*r* o r\ 4r\ o n o n ^ /-f 1~\ 11^ » rr r ^ f l - i o v " fKoi^v v a n f 
JLKJI uiv^ t A i i a u o i ojyoiv^iii 10 n u t i v i ^ i i v u LU a o c l i i ^ u i i n g , VJUA^I m a n l t u i . 
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 The "PAID BY LANDLORD" list contained in Exhibit "B" to the lease 
clarifies that the amounts paid by the tenant to cover the exhaust system cost was 
classified as rent: "[exhaust system] for kitchen...to be installed by Tenant, but 
cost of equipment and installation financed by Landlord and repaid through rent" 
R. at 195 (emphasis added). 
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Not only did Fetter not personally guarantee the exhaust system, he did not 
guarantee the payment of rent.5 Because the payment for the exhaust system was 
classified by the parties as rent, Fetter is not liable for that expense under the 
guaranty.6 
POINT 3. 
FETTER HAS NOT WAIVED THE DEFENSE 
OF SURRENDER AND ACCEPTANCE 
Fetter acknowledges his answer to the amended complaint does not 
specifically contain an affirmative defense defined as "surrender and acceptance." 
However, the issue was raised during the summary judgment phase of this lawsuit. 
See R. at 273-280. Brailsford never challenged Fetter's reliance upon that doctrine 
during the summary judgment proceedings. 
5
 It is noteworthy that despite Brailsford's attempt to have the guaranty 
construed broadly, he has not argued that Fetter guaranteed the payment of rent. 
6
 Brailsford tries to make a big deal out of the fact a separate amortization 
schedule was prepared for repayment of the exhaust system and that separate 
checks were paid for the exhaust system portion of the rental payments. First, 
Brailsford's prior counsel has already represented on the record that the fact 
separate checks were written "really doesn't matter." R. at 433 (p. 31). 
Additionally, Fetter has explained the reason why separate checks were written. 
There were ongoing disputes concerning which party was responsible to pay for 
what mechanical improvements. Fetter created an amortization schedule and wrote 
separate checks for accounting purposes. R. at 201-202. Brailsford cannot make 
the leap that because separate checks may have been written, Fetter guaranteed 
those payments. The amortized payments for the exhaust system were defined as 
rental payments no matter how the payments were made. 
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It is well settled in Utah that the failure to include a defense in the pleadings 
is not necessarily fatal. See F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 404 P.2d 670, 
671 (Utah 1965) ("this rule is not so sacrosanct as to be inviolable"). "If the 
interests of justice so require and the opposing party is given fair opportunity to 
meet such a defense, the trial court may permit the issue to be tried." Id. See also 
Olpin v. Grove Fin. Co., 521 P.2d 1221, 1223 (Utah 1974). 
In the present matter, the surrender and acceptance issue was placed on the 
table long ago, and without any prior argument by Brailsford that it had been 
waived because it was not specifically set forth in the pleadings. Brailsford, by its 
failure to object until now, has essentially acquiesced and the issue is appropriate 
for consideration on appeal. 
POINT 4. 
THE DOCTRINE OF SURRENDER 
AND ACCEPTANCE IS APPLICABLE 
Brailsford argues the doctrine of surrender and acceptance is inapplicable to 
this case because the subject obligation is not rent. However, as argued in Point 2 
above, a clear reading of the lease reveals that if anything, the tenant's obligation 
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to pay for the exhaust system over time was classified as rent. Because the 
obligation is classified as rent, the doctrine of surrender and acceptance applies. 
In any event, the overriding concern is Brailsford's apparent attempt to 
avoid the consequences of the landlord's duty to mitigate damages and the 
prohibition against double recovery. Brailsford's argument that the tenant 
continued to be liable for the payment of rent following the termination of the lease 
ignores the landlord's duty to mitigate damages. Brailsford also fails to readily 
acknowledge that at some point, the premises were relet to a new restaurant 
operator. Despite this, Brailsford contends that the tenant remained liable for the 
full, unpaid balance of the exhaust system, even when the premises were relet to a 
third party. 
At a minimum, even if the tenant remained liable, and assuming Fetter was 
liable as a guarantor, there are certainly fact questions concerning the amount of 
liability. Despite this, the trial court simply entered judgment for the full balance 
of the cost of the exhaust system without considering the impact of the landlord's 
duty to mitigate, double recovery concerns and Fetter's claim for offsets. 
The surrender and acceptance cases cited by Brailsford in his brief agree 
that the doctrine works to excuse liability for rent accruing after the surrender and 
acceptance occurs. See Nicholas A. Cutaia, Inc. v. Buyer's Bazaar, Inc., 224 A.D. 
2d 952 (N.Y. App. 1996); Peterson v. Hodges, 239 P.2d 180 (Utah 1951). 
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POINT 5. 
FETTER'S CLAIM FOR OFFSET 
WAS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT 
Fetter's defense of offset was specifically set forth in his answer to the 
amended complaint. R. at 113. Furthermore, the issue was debated during the 
summary judgment proceedings in the trial court. See id. at 231-239, 241-242, 
273-280. The issue of offset is appropriately before this court for consideration. 
Additionally, at a minimum, because there are questions of fact surrounding the 
offset issue, it was improper for the trial court to enter summary judgment 
concerning the amount of liability. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should reverse the trial court's summary judgment against Fetter. 
Reading the lease and the guaranty in conjunction with each other reveals that 
while Fetter guaranteed the tenant's obligations specifically defined in the lease, he 
did not guarantee the payment for the exhaust system. Additionally, the guaranty 
did not cover the rental payments that were designed to cover the landlord's 
expense for the exhaust system. Brailsford's broad argument that Fetter is liable 
for each and every obligation the tenant had under the lease is incorrect. Fetter 
only guaranteed those items referenced in the guaranty, which must be strictly 
construed. In short, Fetter's guaranty obligation extended only to the items 
contained on the "PAID BY TENANT" list in Exhibit UB" to the lease. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / day of September, 2004. 
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